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Clandestine Marriage and Parental Consent in John Calvin's Geneva:  
The Gradual Synthesis of Theology, Statutes, and Case Law  
 





Parental consent to engagement and marriage was one of the staples of early 
Protestant theology and law.  John  
Calvin and his Genevan colleague declared parental consent, like individual consent, to 
be indispensable to the validity of a minor’s engagement.  The Geneva Consistory 
inquired closely into the engagements of minors, and routinely dissolved them if their 
parents dissented.  Not only the couple themselves, but also a parent, guardian, witness, 
or notary to an engagement contract could be punished if they failed to get the necessary 
consent from both sets of parents.  But Calvin ultimately rejected the law of some 
Protestant communities that allowed parents to annul their children’s clandestine 
marriages as well, declaring, fearing the dangers of parental tyranny and the costs of 
marital breakup to the couple and their children. He addressed these issues at length in 
his writings and sermons, and applied these teachings in the detailed work of the 
Genevan Consistory. 
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1 This article represents work in progress on a multi-volume project with Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage 
and Family in John Calvin's Geneva published by Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.  The first 
volume, subtitled Courtship, Engagement and Marriage (2005) is in print; the second volume, subtitled The 
Christian Household¸ will soon go to press.  I wish to thank the late Professor Kingdon and Dr. Thomas A. 
Lambert for their expert commentary and criticisms, and Mr. M. Wallace McDonald for his diligent research 
and excellent translations of the Consistory cases in the Genevan archives sampled in the third section of 
this article.   
I shall be using the following standard abbreviations throughout: CO - Ioannis Calivini opera quae supersunt 
omnia, ed. W. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, 59 vols., Corpus Reformatorum series, vols. 29-87 
(Brunswick, 1863-1900); R. Consist. -- Robert M. Kingdon et al. eds. Registres du Consistoire de Genève 
au Temps de Calvin, 21 vols. (Geneva: 1996- ); R. Conseil -- Les Registres du Conseil de Genève, ed. 









John Calvin (1509-1564), the Protestant Reformer of Geneva, transformed the 
Western theology and law of sex, marriage, and family life.  Building on a generation of 
Protestant reforms elsewhere in northern Europe, Calvin constructed a comprehensive 
new theology and jurisprudence that made marital formation and dissolution, children’s 
nurture and welfare, family cohesion and support, and sexual sin and crime essential 
concerns for both church and state.  Working with other jurists and theologians, Calvin 
drew the Consistory and Council of Geneva into a creative new alliance to govern sex, 
marriage, and family life in the city. Together, these authorities outlawed monasticism and 
mandatory clerical celibacy, and encouraged marriage for all fit adults.  They set clear 
guidelines for courtship and engagement.  They mandated parental consent, peer 
witness, church consecration, and state registration for valid marriage formation.  They 
radically reconfigured weddings and wedding feasts.  They reformed marital property and 
inheritance, marital consent and impediments.  They created new rights and duties for 
wives within the bedroom and for children within the household.  They streamlined the 
grounds and procedures for annulment.  They introduced fault-based divorce for both 
husbands and wives on grounds of adultery and desertion.  They encouraged the 
remarriage of divorcées and widow(er)s.  They punished rape, fornication, prostitution, 
sodomy, and other sexual felonies with startling new severity.  They put firm new 
restrictions on dancing, sumptuousness, ribaldry, and obscenity.  They put new stock in 
catechesis and education, and created new schools, curricula, and teaching aids.  They 
provided new sanctuary to illegitimate, abandoned, and abused children.  They created 
new protections for abused wives and impoverished widows.  Many of these reforms of 
sixteenth-century Geneva were echoed and elaborated in numerous Reformed 
communities, on both sides of the Atlantic, and a good number of these reforms found 
their way into our modern civil law and common law traditions.2  
 
This chapter analyzes a small but important part of Calvin's reformation, namely, 
the doctrine of parental consent to their child's engagement and marriage.  Parental 
consent was one of the bright flashpoints of confessional dispute between Protestants 
and Catholics in the Reformation era.  In the first third of the sixteenth century, Protestant 
leaders like Martin Luther, Martin Bucer, Ulrich Zwingli, and others had championed 
mandatory parental consent as their biblical answer to the late medieval toleration of 
‘clandestine’3 engagements and marriages.  And Protestant magistrates soon instituted 
 
 
2 This is the thesis of Witte and Kingdon, Sex, Marriage and Family in John Calvin’s Geneva. 
3 In Calvin’s Geneva, the phrase ‘clandestine marriage’ generally meant marriages contracted without 
parental consent (and occasionally also without two witnesses).  According to some recent studies, 
‘clandestine marriage’ had a second meaning in the day: marriages between parties who married despite 
an absolute impediment (such as incest or precontract) that they knew but kept clandestine.  Some case 
studies in France and Germany suggest that the second type of clandestine marriage was heavily litigated 
in late medieval church courts.  See Klaus M. Linder, Courtship and the Courts: Marriage and Law in 
Southern Germany, 1350-1550 (Th.D. Diss. Harvard, 1988), 126ff.; Beatrice Gottlieb, ‘The Meaning of 
Clandestine Marriage,’ in Family and Sexuality in French History, ed. Robert Wheaton and Tamara K. 
Hareven (Philadelphia: 1980), 53; Reinhard Lettmann, Die Diskussion über die klandestinen Ehen und die 
Einführung einer zur Gültigkeit verpflichtenden Eheschliessung auf dem Konzil von Trent (Münster: 1967).  







new marriage ordinances with a firm parental consent requirement built into their marital 
formation rules.4  In 1563, the Council of Trent instituted similar requirements into the 
canon law of the Catholic Church.  
 
Calvin and his Genevan colleagues ultimately carved out something of a via media 
between late medieval Catholic and the early Protestant teachings on parental consent.  
In Calvin’s Geneva, the consent of the couple was indispensable to the validity of both 
their engagement and their marriage.  Without the free and full consent of both the man 
and the woman, the engagement and marriage contracts were void. The consent of 
parents (or guardians) was equally indispensable to the validity of a minor child’s 
engagement and marriage.  The consent of the father was sufficient; the consent of the 
mother counted only if the father was absent and other relatives concurred.  In the 
absence of both parents, guardians would give their consent, again with priority for the 
male voice.   
 
Clandestine engagements were presumptively void in Calvin’s Geneva.  Either 
fiancé(e), either set of parents, or even a third party (including a zealous minister or 
magistrate) could have these engagements annulled and the children punished.   
 
Clandestine marriages, however, were presumptively valid.  Neither the couple nor 
their parents could have their marriages annulled just because they had been contracted 
without parental consent.  Calvin came to this position on the validity of clandestine 
marriages only reluctantly in later life, aware that he was now closer to medieval Catholic 
teachings than to the teachings of some other Protestants, and even the Council of Trent.   
 
As with several other topics on marriage and family life, Calvin first set out his legal 
views on parental consent in some detail in a lengthy Marriage Ordinance that he first 
drafted for the city of Geneva in 1545 and then revised with a committee in 1546.5  Over 
 
 
Consistory adjudicated.  The Consistory did occasionally encounter and punish parties who tried to keep 
their known impediments clandestine, but they did not apply the term ‘clandestine’ or ‘clandestine marriage’ 
to these instances.  
4 See, among many others, Steven Ozment, When Fathers Ruled: Family Life in Reformation Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: 1983); id., Ancestors: The Loving Family in Old Europe (Cambridge, MA: 2001); Lawrence 
Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York: 1979); Robert M. Kingdon, 
Adultery and Divorce in Calvin's Geneva (Cambridge, MA: 1995); Herman Selderhuis, Marriage and 
Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer, trans. J. Vriend and Lyle D. Bierma (Kirksville, MO: 1999); John 
Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Religion, Marriage, and Law in the Western Tradition (Louisville, 
KY: 1997). 
5 On August 3, 1545, the Council had commissioned Calvin and the four syndics to prepare a draft marriage 
ordinance.  R. Conseil 40:202v. A draft ordinance was completed on November 5, 1545, presented to the 
Small Council on November 10, and to 12 representatives of the General Council on November 13.  It was 
commended but not formally approved, and circulated thereafter among ministers and magistrates of 
Geneva and beyond in slightly varying drafts.  CO 10/1:33n.  On November 11, 1549, another committee, 
again led by Calvin, was convened to study existing marriage law and to recommend improvements to the 
Marriage Ordinance.  R. Conseil 44:261v.   Calvin presented his report on November 25, but complained on 
January 20, February 17 and 24, 1550 that still no official position had been taken on the ordinance.  R. 
Conseil 44:273v, 306v, 324v, 329v.  On May 1, 1551, Calvin again complained to the Council that the lack 







the next fifteen years, he gradually laid out his theological rationale for these legal views 
and made modest legal refinements.  From the start, the Geneva Consistory and Council, 
that together governed marriage and family law questions for the city, followed the 1546 
Marriage Ordinance to the letter, helping to make the doctrine of parental consent a vital 
part of the Genevan Reformation.  
 
 
The 1546 Marriage Ordinance and its Interpretation 
 
Like the medieval canonists before him, Calvin started with the principle of freedom 
of marital contract.  Marriage, he insisted, depended in its essence on the mutual consent 
of both the man and the woman.  Absent proof of consent by a fit man and a fit woman 
who had the freedom and capacity to marry, there could be no valid marriage.  Calvin 
defended this principle repeatedly in his commentaries and sermons. ‘While all contracts 
ought to be voluntary, freedom ought to prevail especially in marriage, so that no one may 
pledge his faith against his will.’6  ‘God considers that compulsory and forced marriages 
never come to a good end.... [I]f the husband and the wife are not in mutual agreement 
and do not love each other, this is a profanation of marriage, and not a marriage at all, 
properly speaking.  For the will is the principal bond.’7  When a woman wishes to marry, 
she must thus not ‘be thrust into it reluctantly or compelled to marry against her will, but 
left to her own free choice.’8  ‘When a man is going to marry and he takes a wife, let him 
take her of his own free will, knowing that where there is not a true and pure love, there is 
nothing but disorder, and one can expect no grace from God.’9   
 
Also like the medieval canonists, Calvin distinguished between contracts of 
engagement and contracts of marriage -- or betrothals and espousals as he called them, 
following the tradition.  Engagements were future promises to be married.  Marriages 
were present promises to be married.   But, unlike the medieval canonists, Calvin 
removed the need for the parties to use specific formulaic words: any clear indication of a 
future or present intent to marry would do.  He softened the distinction and shortened the 
duration between engagements and marriages.  He also insisted that the engagement 
contract be announced through public banns in the church and community and registered 
with the civil authorities, and that the marriage contract be celebrated in a mandatory 
church wedding.  
 
The 1546 Marriage Ordinance took pains to ensure the free and full consent of 
both parties to the engagement and marriage contracts.  It required that both sets of 
 
 
received formal endorsement, now with a few more amendments.  See detailed notes in CO 10/1:33 n. The 
1545 and 1546 draft is in CO 10/1:33-44 and in Jean-Francois Bergier and Robert M. Kingdon, eds., 
Registres de la compagnie des pasteurs de Genève au temps de Calvin, 2 vols. (Geneva: 1964), 1:30-38.  
The final 1561 version is incorporated in Les Ordonnances ecclesiastiques (1561) in CO, 10/1:91-124. 
6 Comm. Josh. 15:14.  
7 Serm. Deut. 25:5-12. 
8 Comm. Gen. 24:57. 







promises be made ‘simply’ and ‘honorably in the fear of God.’10 Engagements were to be 
initiated by ‘a sober proposal’ from the man, accepted by the woman, and witnessed by at 
least two persons of ‘good reputation.’11  Engagements made in clandestine, qualified 
with onerous conditions, or procured by coercion were automatically annulled -- and the 
couple themselves, and any accomplices in their wrongdoing, could face punishment.  
Engagements procured through trickery or ‘surprise,’ or made ‘frivolously, as when merely 
touching glasses when drinking together,’ could be annulled on petition by either party.12  
Engagement promises extracted by or from children below the age of consent were 
presumptively invalid, though children could confirm them upon reaching majority.  
Engagements involving a newcomer to the city were not valid until the parties produced 
proof of the newcomer's integrity of character and eligibility for marriage.  Absent such 
proof, the couple had to wait a year before they could marry.13 
 
Normally, a Genevan couple, once properly betrothed, had little time to waste.  
Neither their publicly announced engagement nor the civil registration of their marriage 
was sufficient to constitute a marriage.  A formal church wedding had to follow -- within six 
weeks of engagement.  If the couple procrastinated in their wedding plans, they would be 
reprimanded by the Consistory; if they persisted, they would be ‘sent before the Council 
so that they may be compelled to celebrate it.’14   
 
Not only the mutual consent of the parties, but also the consent of their parents 
was critical to the validity of an engagement and marriage contract. Calvin devoted no 
less than eight of the first ten articles of his 1546 Marriage Ordinance to the doctrine of 
parental consent.  In the 1545 draft, Calvin had seemed so eager to maximize the rights 
of parental consent that he set the age of majority unusually high: Boys had to be 24, girls 
20 before they could marry without seeking their parents’ consent.15  The 1546 Marriage 
Ordinance lowered these ages of majority to 20 and 18 for boys and girls respectively.16  
This was closer to the Protestant norm but still a bit high, and Calvin still advised that 
even fully emancipated children ‘always be governed by the advice of their fathers.’17    
 
The consent of the father was the most critical.  The consent of the mother 
controlled only when the father was absent and no other relatives were present.  If other 
relatives were at hand, the mother’s views had to concur with theirs.18  In his 1545 draft, 
Calvin had said that, in the absence of the father, the mother needed to have the 
concurrence only of the ‘closest and most important’ relatives to consent to a marriage.19  
He dropped this qualification in the 1546 version.  Now it read that the mother’s consent 
 
 
10 Item 11, 15, CO 10/1:33ff. 
11 Ibid., item 6. 
12 Ibid., item 11 
13 Ibid., item 19. 
14 Ibid., item 16 
15 Ibid., item 1 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., item 10. 








would count only if and until she had ‘consulted one of the relatives if there are any’ -- 
without regard for their ‘closeness’ or ‘importance’ to the family.  In the absence of both 
parents, guardians would give their consent to a child’s engagement and marriage, again 
with priority for the male voice.   
 
The 1546 Marriage Ordinance made clear that this parental consent was only a 
supplement to, not a substitute for, the consent of the couple themselves.  Parents were 
prohibited from coercing their children into unwanted engagements, or withholding their 
consent or payment of dowry until the child chose a partner whom they favored.20  
Parents were further prevented from forcing youngsters into marriage before they were 
mature enough to consent to and participate safely in the institution.  Children ‘observing 
a modest and reverend spirit,’ could refuse to follow their parents' insistence on an 
unwanted fiancé(e) or a premature engagement.21 Other children, confronting a ‘negligent 
or excessively strict’ father, could ‘have him compelled to give a dowry’ in support of a 
marriage they contracted in spite of him.22 
 
The main goal of these provisions was to stamp out the medieval Catholic 
Church’s toleration of what the 1546 Marriage Ordinance called private or ‘clandestine 
promises’ (promesse clandestine) -- that is, engagements and marriages contracted 
without parental consent.23   
 
The Ordinance made clear that clandestine engagement promises were ‘void’ 
(nulle).24  This did not necessarily prevent a clandestinely-engaged couple from going 
forward with their plans if they received their parents’ consent after the fact.  But, absent 
this parental consent, if anyone challenged this engagement because it had been 
clandestinely contracted, the engagement would be annulled regardless of what the 
couple wished.  
 
The Ordinance was not so clear about the legal status of clandestine marriage 
promises -- especially if they had been celebrated, consummated, and yielded children.  
The crucial statutory language was in item 3 of the 1546 Marriage Ordinance.  There, 
Calvin provided:  
 
If it happens that two young people have contracted marriage by their 
own action, through folly or recklessness, let them be punished and 
chastened and such a marriage be dissolved at the request of those 
who have charge of them.25 
 
It was clear from this language that children who entered such clandestine marriages 
 
 
20 Ibid., item 8 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., item 7. 
23 Ibid., item 6.   








would be punished.  What was not clear was whether their marriage would be annulled if 
challenged by their parents.   
 
A plain reading of item 3 suggests that parents could seek annulment of their 
children’s clandestinely ‘contracted marriage.’  On this reading, while clandestine 
engagements were automatically ‘void,’ clandestine marriages were voidable.  They 
would be voided only if and when the children’s parents or others ‘who have charge of 
them’ brought an action of annulment.    
 
But this reading does not pick up the studied ambiguity in the language of item 3.  
First, the opening phrase ‘two young people’ might well have meant only youngsters who 
were not only below the age of majority but also below the age of consent.  Read as such, 
item 3 was only a statement of the familiar medieval impediment of infancy: that infants 
and youth may not enter marriage contracts, and when they do, their parents or guardians 
need to have those promises dissolved or at least postponed until the children reached an 
age where they could consent or dissent to them.  This was, in fact, how that phrase 
came to be read by the Genevan Consistory in its case law.26 
 
Second, the phrase ‘contracted marriage’ (contracte mariage) could mean either 
(1) ‘contracted to get married in the future’; or (2) ‘had already entered a marriage 
contract.’  If the phrase meant the former, then item 3 would mean simply that parents 
had standing to bring an action to annul their child’s clandestine engagement promise.  
These standing rights of the parents were not specified elsewhere in the statute.  It made 
good sense to stipulate them, particularly since in 1546 when Calvin was drafting the 
Ordinance the Consistory had no other rules of civil procedure to guide them.27 Even if 
the phrase ‘contracted marriage’ meant the latter (that the children ‘had already entered a 
marriage contract’) the matter was still not resolved.  For final validity of the marriage 
turned on whether the couple had celebrated their marriage in a proper wedding liturgy in 
the church, not whether they had entered a marriage contract.  In Calvin’s Geneva, 
marriage contracts without church weddings were not valid – and those contracted 
clandestinely or without ceremonies outside of Geneva, would have to be recontracted 
and celebrated in Geneva in order to be valid.28   
 
Third, the two subsequent phrases of item 3 were also ambiguous.  The phrase, 
‘by their own action’ (de leur propre mouvement), was separated by a comma from the 
 
 
26 Witte and Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family, 1:202-19. 
27 What survives of Calvin’s efforts to draft a code of civil procedure is in CO 10/1:132-139, analyzed in 
detail in Josef Bohatec, Calvin und das Recht (Graz: 1934), 209-279.  Nothing in the fragmentary draft, 
however, addresses issues of standing in domestic litigation.  
28 Calvin prepared a detailed marriage liturgy in 1542, which he revised substantially in 1545, and 
cosmetically in 1547, 1558, 1559, 1562, and 1563.  The 1545 version is in CO 6:203-208.  Calvin included 
legal provisions mandating weddings in his 1541 Ecclesiastical Ordinances (CO 10/1:26) and in his 1546 
Marriage Ordinance (CO 10/1:36-37).  On the importance of his reforms of marriage liturgy, see Henri 
Vuilleumier, Histoire de L’Eglise Réformée du pays de Vaud sous le Régime Bernois, 2 vols. (Lausanne: 
1927), 1:310-314, 345-348; Bryan D. Spinks, ‘The Liturgical Origins and Theology of Calvin's Marriage 







next phrase, ‘through folly or recklessness’ (par follie ou legierté).  These two phrases 
could be read separately.  This reading would allow parents to seek annulment of the 
pending marriage either (1) if it was contracted clandestinely by the couple (‘by their own 
action’); or (2) if the marriage, even if done with the parent’s consent, proved to be 
‘foolish’ or ‘reckless.’  Alternatively, the two phrases could be read interdependently -- 
with the second phrase understood as a qualification of the first.  This reading would allow 
parents to attack a clandestine marriage only if it could be shown that the marriage itself 
was not only clandestinely contracted (‘by their own action’) but also was foolish or 
recklessly entered.  This was not so easy a standard to meet.  Children who married 
clandestinely sometimes did so not with recklessness but with elaborate plans to 
circumvent their parents.  And many times their marriages, while not necessarily well 
advised, were hardly ‘foolish,’ especially if they were motivated by a desire to get away 
from overbearing, abusive, or bickering parents.   
 
All this close exegesis might seem like silly legal hairsplitting.  But Calvin, who was 
well trained in law, may well have intended the language of the Ordinance to be a bit 
open-textured.  For the legal status of parental consent and clandestine marriages was a 
divisive question at the time he was drafting the Ordinance.  The first generation of 
Protestant reformers had required parental consent in an effort to counter the late 
medieval Catholic practice of tolerating clandestine engagements and marriages.  All the 
leading Protestant reformers allowed parents to annul their children’s clandestine 
engagements.  The question that began to divide Protestants sharply after 1540 was 
whether parents could annul their children’s clandestine marriages, too.  Some reformers 
allowed parents to annul their clandestine marriages under any circumstances.  Some 
allowed the same, unless the wife was pregnant or already had children.  Some favored 
continuation of the clandestine marriage.  Some insisted on it.  The new Protestant laws 
of the day reflected these disparate views.29  This issue became even more divisive in the 
1540s and 1550s, when Catholics began accusing Protestants of frivolously dissolving 
marriages and foolishly catering to the tyranny of parents through their wooden 
application of the doctrine of parental consent.30   
 
Calvin’s 1546 Marriage Ordinance did not clearly answer the question whether 
parents could seek annulment of their children’s clandestine marriages.  In 1549, Calvin 
seemed inclined to allow such annulments. The occasion was Calvin’s commentary on 
the Adultero-German Interim (1548), a new imperial law designed to establish the 
emerging Catholic teachings of the Council of Trent.  The Interim insisted that even 
clandestine marriages were indissoluble because they were sacramental.31  Calvin stood 
 
 
29 See sources and discussion in John Witte, Jr. From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law 
in the Western Tradition, 2d. enl. ed. (Louisville, KY: 2012), chaps. 5-7; Hartwig Dieterich, Die 
Protestantische Eherecht in Deutschland bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (München: 1970), 123-127.  
30 G.H. Joyce, Christian Marriage: An Historical and Doctrinal Study, 2d rev. ed. (London: 1948), 116-124, 
416. 
31 Art. XXI.10 of the Adultero-German Interim read: ‘Since the father’s power justly yields to a union 
between the parties, you should not listen to those who now insist that contracted betrothals or marriages 
are dissolved and nullified if there is no consent of the parents.  In this, we do not derogate from the 







this argument on its head: If a marriage was indissoluble because it was sacramental, 
shouldn’t its sacramental status turn on whether the couple had entered it properly, 
including their procurement of parental consent:  
 
Of marriages rashly contracted by young persons, let me just say 
this: It is as easy to deny a word as it is for our moderators to assert 
one.  Who revealed to them that such marriages should be 
binding?... The dignity of the sacrament, they say, is to be preferred 
to a parent’s right. [But] the more dignity there is in marriage, the 
more modesty and religion should attend those who enter it.32 
 
A decade later, Calvin seemed inclined to regard clandestine marriages as ill-
advised, but not subject to annulment by parents or anyone else.  ‘All good men properly 
disapprove of clandestine marriages which offer an opportunity and even, in fact, an open 
door to many disgraceful acts,’ he wrote in a 1557 consilium.33  But even a clandestinely 
contracted marriage precluded a party from entering a second engagement or marriage -- 
regardless of whether the parents or guardians of the doubly-contracted child now 
consented to the second match.  
 
By 1560, Calvin had settled the matter in his mind.   Clandestine marriages, once 
contracted, celebrated, and consummated, could not be annulled absent proof of some 
other impediment.  Neither a dissenting parent nor a distraught husband or wife could 
seek annulment of the marriage on grounds that it was clandestinely contracted.  Indeed, 
if the marriage was unhappy, it was just what the clandestinely married couple deserved.  
As Calvin put it in a consilium of 1560:  
 
When an adolescent has married without his parents’ knowledge, he 
should recognize that he is paying a just penalty for his heedless 
behavior if his wife is unresponsive to him.  He did not offer God and 
his parents the obedience he owed them, and he should not be 
surprised if he gets his just reward in the form of his wife’s defiance.34 
 
This moved Calvin very close to what was the actual bottom line of the medieval 
canonists: Clandestine marriages were formally prohibited, but when they occurred, the 
 
 
or dissolving marriages.  But, since we think it is good for children not to contract [marriage] without the 
advice and consent of parents, the preachers should carefully instruct them in their duty.’ Translated in John 
Calvin, Tracts and Treatises in Defense of the Reformed Faith, trans. Henry Beveridge, 3 vols. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: 1958), 3:220. 
32 John Calvin, Vera Christianae Pacificationis et Ecclesiae Reformandae Ratio (1549), CO 7:640. 
33 CO 10/1:242-244, with translation in Calvin’s Ecclesiastical Advice, trans. Mary Beaty and Benjamin W. 
Farley, ed. John H. Leith (Louisville, KY: 1978), 135. 
34 Consilium (Sept. 1, 1560), CO 10/1:252-254. Calvin continued: ‘Because it is not disagreement over 
religion which is tearing the marriage apart, he should fulfill his marital duty as long as he can live with his 
wife without danger.  If greater force and necessity compel him to leave her, he should remain celibate until 
his wife recovers her senses or gives him cause to divorce her.’ Ibid., using translation in Calvin’s 







marriage should stand and the couple be punished. The medieval canonists used 
sacramental logic: even clandestine marriages could not be dissolved because they were 
sacramental.  Calvin used prudential logic: Even clandestine marriages could not be 
dissolved because that catered to parental tyranny, left despoiled virgins vulnerable to 
spinsterhood, and consigned any children of the union to the bane of bastardy.  
 
 
Calvin’s Theological Reflections  
 
While Calvin dithered on the issue of whether parents could annul clandestine 
marriages, he was decisively in favor of the doctrine of parental consent.  In his 1546 
Commentary on 1 Corinthians 7, published shortly after his Marriage Ordinance, Calvin 
argued that parental consent to marriage was a ‘sacred right’ of parents and a ‘moral 
duty’ of children.35  It enabled parents to guide their children in this final fateful step 
toward adulthood, and it prevented children from choosing their mates imprudently or 
impetuously.  Particularly when children were still young and vulnerable, it ensured that 
the marriage was formed by free, full, and mature consent on all sides.  
 
Parental consent, Calvin insisted, does not license ‘parental tyranny’ over children 
nor can it substitute for the consent of the child to the marriage.  The ‘proper rule’ of 
parental consent is that ‘children should allow themselves to be governed by their 
parents, and that they, on the other hand, do not drag their children by force to what is 
against their inclination, and that they have no other object in view, in the exercise of their 
authority, than the advantage of their children.’36  If parents abused their authority, and 
coerced their children into unwanted engagements or marriages, therefore, such 
contracts should be annulled.37   
   
The doctrine of parental consent to marriage ‘originated in the common laws of 
nature,’ Calvin argued in his same 1546 Commentary on 1 Corinthians.38  Calvin adverted 
to these natural law origins of the doctrine several more times in later writings. ‘Nature 
herself dictates that the authority of parents is necessary,’ he wrote in 1549. ‘This has 
always been observed by the law of nations and is approved by the testimony of 
 
 
35 Comm. 1 Cor. 7:36-38. 
36 CO 49: 425-426. 
37 Calvin applied this principle of no parental coercion clearly in an undated consilium (CO 10/1:238-239).  
The case sent to him for his advice involved a young woman named Marguerite.  Her mother had tricked 
and forced her into marrying a young man named Jean.  Jean’s brother, aunt, and servant were apparently 
part of the conspiracy as well.  Marguerite was trapped into going through with the wedding.  But she was 
distraught throughout the ceremony and maintained consistently thereafter that she was not married.  At 
least two witnesses testified that she did not say her wedding vows but was silent throughout the ceremony.  
The notary who recorded the marriage contract testified that the marriage ‘was not of God’ because 
Marguerite had not consented to it.  Calvin concluded that because ‘the girl was forced into it, no foundation 
for marriage exists.’  A properly constituted court should examine Marguerite and her mother closely.  If 
their testimony holds true, the court should annul the marriage, and leave the young woman free to marry 
another – and punish the mother and her conspirators for coercing the child. 







Scripture.’39  In 1554, he wrote: ‘[S]ince marriage forms a principal part of human life, it is 
right that, in contracting it, children should be subject to their parents, and should obey 
their counsel. This order [is what] nature prescribes and dictates.’40  And again: ‘[I]t is not 
lawful for the children of a family to contract marriage, except with the consent of parents.  
And, certainly, natural equity dictates that, in a matter of such importance, children should 
depend upon the will of the parents.’41   
 
Surprisingly, Calvin did not ground the doctrine of parental consent to marriage in 
the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: ‘Honor thy father and thy mother’ (Ex. 20:12; 
Deut. 5:16) and the amplification of the Commandment by St. Paul (Eph. 6:1-2; Col. 
3:20).42  Other Protestant Reformers had made the Fifth Commandment a critical source 
of the right of both fathers and mothers to give their consent to marriage, and the 
correlative duty of their children to seek the consent of both parents.  This was part and 
product of their elaborate efforts to ground a whole new Protestant legal system in the 
Ten Commandments.43 Calvin did not take this step, at least with respect to the doctrine 
of parental consent.  He might well have been constrained by his insistence in the 1546 
Marriage Ordinance that it was the father’s, not the mother’s, consent that was essential.  
It would have been hard for him to press the father’s superior authority on the strength of 
a Commandment to ‘Honor thy father and thy mother.’ 
 
This is not to say that Calvin had a narrow view of the Fifth Commandment or a 
restricted view of a parent’s authority or a child’s obedience.  In his numerous pages of 
commentaries, sermons, and catechism entries on the Fifth Commandment, he regularly 
described parents, especially fathers, as God’s vice-regents on earth, in whose title and 
office God has invested a measure of his being and power, making them ‘something 
divine.’44  He called upon children to render to their parents forms of ‘reverence, 
obedience, and gratefulness’ comparable to what they rendered to God – at least up to 
the point of violating the Bible and their conscience.45   
 
 
39 CO 7:639-640.  
40 Comm. Gen. 21:20, CO 23:305-306. In his first edition of the Institutes (1536), Calvin condemned the 
Catholic canon law for allowing that ‘marriages between minors contracted without parental consent should 
remain firm and valid,’ which he considered contrary to ‘the laws of all nations and also against the 
ordinances of Moses.’ CO 1:194-195.  Calvin repeated this charge almost verbatim in his 1559 Institutes.  
See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion [1559], ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles 
(Philadelphia: 1960), 4.19.37 [hereafter Institutes 1559].  
41 Comm. Gen. 24:1-3, CO 23:329-333. 
42 This is treated as the Fourth Commandment in Catholic and Lutheran traditions.  On various traditions of 
numbering and dividing the Ten Commandments, see Bo Ivar Reicke, Die Zehn Worte in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart (Tübingen: 1973); Paul Grimley Kuntz, The Ten Commandments in History (Grand Rapids, MI: 
2004).   
43 John Witte, Jr., Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge: 
2002), 113-115, 125-127, 169-174. 
44 Institutes (1559), 2.8.35. 
45 Ibid., 2.8.36-38.  This caveat, of obeying up to the point of violating God’s law, does not appear in his 
exegesis of the Decalogue in 1536 Institutes, chap. 1 or in Calvin’s 1555 Sermons on Deuteronomy 5:16.  It 
might well signal part of Calvin’s emerging theory of resistance to tyrannical authority – whether parental, 
political, or ecclesiastical.  On this see John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and 








Calvin gave many examples of the proper obedience that children should render to 
their parents in conformity with the Decalogue.  Included was the duty of children, which 
Calvin rooted in the Third Commandment, to seek their father’s consent to make ‘a 
binding oath,’ and the duty of the father, in turn, not to withhold or condition his consent 
capriciously.46  Calvin concluded that, ‘if a daughter, while living with her father, has 
vowed anything without his knowledge, it is of no force.’  This was the closest Calvin 
came to tying the doctrine of parental consent to marriage to the Fifth Commandment.47   
 
To ground his doctrine of parental consent, Calvin was more content to point 
favorably to the examples in the Bible of how some early patriarchs participated in the 
marriages of their children.  For Calvin these were examples, as well as 
counterexamples, of the natural law in operation.48  Calvin saw in the biblical story of 
Abraham’s pursuit of a wife for his son Isaac (Gen. 24:1-67) a particularly good lesson of 
how and why the natural law of parental consent should operate.49  Abraham sought to 
ensure that his son Isaac, who had come of age, would marry a woman who was both 
spiritually and physically compatible with him.  He sent out his servant to find just the right 
woman, armed with a clear recitation of the terms of the proposed marriage contract.  The 
servant found a suitable woman in Rebekah.  He sought the consent of Rebekah’s father, 
uncle, and mother.  He then put down a handsome bride price signified by rings and 
bracelets.  All of this was done, Calvin noted, with full consideration of the consent of the 
two children, Isaac and Rebekah.  The servant made sure that Isaac and Rebekah met 
together to ensure their compatibility before the contract was sealed.   
 
Particularly notable for Calvin was that Rebekah’s father, Bethuel, ‘did not exercise 
tyranny over his daughter, so as to thrust her out reluctantly, or to compel her to marry 
against her will, but left her to her own free choice.’50  This stood in marked contrast with 
many other biblical examples of fathers who contracted or coerced their children into 
marriage without consideration of their wishes.  A good such counterexample was Caleb’s 
crass indifference to his daughter Achsah.51 Caleb was one of the spies whom Joshua 
had sent into the newly promised land of Israel.  He was one of the few who had stood up 
against the majority of the people who had despaired about their ability to conquer 
Jericho and who wanted to return to Egypt (Num. 13:6, 30; 14:6).  While God condemned 
the people of Israel for their unbelief, God spared Caleb: ‘because he has a different spirit 
and has followed me fully, I will bring him into the land in which he went, and his 
descendents shall possess it’ (Num. 14:24).  After the conquest of Jericho, Joshua 
rewarded Caleb with an ample plot of land.  But the land was still occupied (Josh. 14:6, 
21:12).  Caleb wanted his soldiers to claim the land and to kill its pagan leader.  Whoever 
killed the leader, Caleb promised, could marry his daughter Achsah.  Othniel killed the 
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leader, and was given Achsah to marry (Josh. 15:16-17). Despite Caleb’s noble place in 
Israelite history, Calvin condemned him roundly: ‘How could Caleb presume to bargain 
concerning his daughter until he knew her wishes,’ Calvin wrote incredulously.  It was no 
excuse that Othniel was a valiant warrior.  That did not necessarily make him the right 
husband for Achsah.  It also did not matter that Achsah ultimately accepted him as her 
husband or indeed that Caleb later obliged her by giving the couple a choice plot of land 
(Josh. 15:18-19).  Caleb must have just forgotten to ask Achsah her wishes while ‘in the 
heat of battle,’ Calvin concluded.  But we have to assume that ‘according to the common 
law the agreement implied the daughter’s consent and was only to take effect if it was 
obtained.’52   
 
Calvin’s condemnation of Caleb was of a piece with his condemnation of other 
fathers and guardians of the Bible who sold their children into slavery or prostitution, or 
put their daughters on the marriage market as prizes to be sold to the highest bidder.53  
Even with the power of parental consent, no father was allowed to do this to his daughter.  
It was the mutual consent both of the husband and the wife, and of the parents and their 
minor children, that makes the marriage.  As Calvin put it:  
 
Although it is the office of parents to settle their daughters in life, they 
are not permitted to exercise tyrannical power or to assign them to 
whatever husbands they think fit without consulting them.  For while 
all contracts ought to be voluntary, freedom ought to prevail 





The Genevan Consistory, on which Calvin sat as Moderator of the Company of 
Pastors, heard a number of cases raising disputes over parental consent.55  The 
Consistory generally followed the letter of the 1546 Marriage Ordinance.  Clandestine 
engagements involving minor children were presumptively void, unless the parents would 
later consent.  Clandestine marriages were presumptively valid, unless the children could 
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demonstrate highly irregular circumstances.  Parents who refused to give their consent 
were little questioned unless the Consistory suspected foul play.  Guardians who refused 
consent were more closely questioned.  Where the views of the fathers and mothers 
conflicted, the Consistory followed the father.  Where the views of mothers and relatives 
conflicted, the mother prevailed.  Parents or guardians who did consent to the 
engagement were responsible to see that the child was married properly and promptly.  
Such parents could neither leave the young couple to their own devices, nor seek to 
withdraw their consent once given.   
 
In most cases, if either party to the engagement was a minor, the Consistory would 
insist on knowing whether their father or guardian consented -- and would order 
postponement of the wedding until they were satisfied. In a 1552 case, for example, 
Louise Loup requested the Consistory to approve her marriage to Nicod des Planches, a 
minor.56  The parties had been engaged before witnesses, and Nicod had given Louise 
an engagement gift. The Consistory wanted to know whether Nicod’s father approved the 
match.  When Nicod reported his father's dissent, the Consistory recommended 
annulment.  
 
Similarly, in another 1552 case, the Consistory summoned to them two minor 
couples, Jenon Ramou and Humbert Gallatin as well as Françoise Tournier and Jean 
Berto.57 The Consistory had learned that the two couples had become clandestinely 
engaged during a party together, each couple apparently serving as witnesses to the 
other’s engagement.  When confronted, the couples said this was all done in jest, and 
they would not want to marry without the consent of the parents.  The Consistory called in 
their parents.  The parents of the two girls dissented because of the manner in which the 
couples had become engaged.  The Consistory sent the case to the Council with a 
recommendation that the engagements be annulled and the two young men punished for 
seducing the women.  The two young women were sent home with a warning to exercise 
more care the next time. 
 
If both children were minors, it was not enough that only one child had received 
parental consent. In a 1557 case, for example, Pierre Clerc asked the Consistory to 
approve the marriage of his minor daughter and Clement de Biffort, also a minor.58  The 
parties had a notarized written engagement contract with mutually favorable terms.  
Father Pierre was eager to see his daughter get married and urged the Consistory’s 
blessing.  Clement, however, had not procured his father’s consent.  Even though 
Clement, too, wanted to marry, the Consistory refused to allow the marriage to go 
forward.  Instead, they sent the case to the Council with a recommendation that the 
notary be punished for notarizing the contract without procuring the consent of one of the 
two fathers. 
 
The Consistory heard a few cases where fathers and mothers differed over 
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whether to consent to their child’s engagement.  Each time the Consistory sided with the 
father.59 Typical was the 1547 case of Etienne de Lonnay and a young girl named 
Maxima.60  Maxima’s mother had consented to the union, and had signed an engagement 
contract that Etienne has prepared.  When called before the Consistory, however, 
Maxima testified that she had not consented to the engagement.  She reported further 
that her father, who was away at the time, also did not consent to the marriage.  For the 
Consistory even this hearsay testimony of the father’s dissent was enough to trigger an 
instant annulment.  On the Consistory’s recommendation, the Council annulled the 
engagement contract.  They also imprisoned the mother both for perjury during trial and 
for consenting to the engagement, evidently in defiance of her husband’s wishes for 
young Maxima. 
 
The Consistory also occasionally heard cases raising conflicts between mothers 
and other relatives regarding the engagement of a minor child.  In a 1545 case, for 
example, Girard Reveillet asked the Consistory to approve his forthcoming marriage to a 
young woman (unnamed in the record).61  Girard testified that he had received the 
consent of his fiancée’s uncle in the presence of several of her other relatives, and they 
had all toasted to confirm the engagement.  When questioned, the woman’s aunt 
confirmed this.  The young woman, however, testified that she had not consented or 
toasted to the marriage, and pled with the Consistory to protect her from this unwanted 
marriage.  The Consistory ordered that she be given help in having her mother and 
brother come to Geneva to testify; her father was evidently not in the picture.  The mother 
appeared the following week, and protested the engagement loudly.  A local minister 
echoed her protest.  
 
Confronted with this conflict between an uncle who consented and a mother who 
did not consent to the young woman’s engagement, the Consistory sent the case to the 
Council.  The Council discovered that Girard was already engaged to someone else in a 
Catholic territory.  Girard returned repeatedly to the Consistory with documents testifying 
that his first engagement was dissolved, and indeed that his first fiancée had married 
someone else.  The Consistory did not believe him.  They became doubly suspicious 
when they learned that his prior fiancée was a Catholic and that Girard had a reputation 
for making frivolous promises.  Though the record ends here, such a marriage could not 
have passed muster with both the young woman and her mother protesting the match. 
 
What was left unclear in this case was what the Consistory would have done if 
both the young woman and her uncle wanted to go forward with the wedding, but the 
mother did not.  The Consistory faced this question squarely in a 1561 case, and they 
sided with the mother.62  Jean Casaux, a minor, had become engaged to Madeleine 
D’Agnon.  Both Jean’s brother and his guardian had consented to and helped facilitate 
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the match. But none of the parties had consulted Jean’s mother, who was a Catholic 
living in a distant town. It turned out that Casaux’s mother refused to consent to any 
engagement until Casaux reached 25, even though she supported his decision to move to 
Geneva (and presumably also to convert to the Reformed faith).  Though the case went 
down on different grounds, the mother’s dissent was enough for the Consistory to annul 
the engagement, despite Casaux’s brother’s consent and despite the fact that the mother 
was a Catholic living well outside Geneva’s jurisdiction.  
 
Once parents or guardians had consented to an engagement, they was obliged to 
see that the parties were properly and promptly married.  A Genevan father named 
Nicolas found this out in 1552.63  About a year before, Nicolas had consented to the 
engagement of his daughter and her fiancé Jaques d’Orléans. Jaques had given the 
young woman a ring and some property as an engagement gift.  The couple had then 
apparently moved away from Geneva and had put off their wedding.  The woman had 
returned the gifts temporarily until Jaques and her brother could work out more suitable 
property arrangements.  Father Nicolas had apparently not known of, or had at least not 
objected to, this delay, though it was in clear violation of the 1546 Marriage Ordinance 
that required the couple to wed within six weeks of their engagement.  Since Nicolas still 
wanted the wedding to go forward, the Consistory ordered him to try to persuade the 
couple to get on with their wedding plans.  If that failed, the Consistory threatened to send 
them all to the Council to have them punished and the engagement annulled because of 
the untoward delay. 
 
Once a father or guardian consented to his minor child’s engagement, he could not 
withdraw it.  Engagement contracts were serious business in Calvin’s Geneva.  The 
Consistory worked hard to ensure that the couples consented to them freely and fully – 
and, if they were minors, that their fathers, mothers, or other guardians consented to them 
freely and fully as well.  But once these engagement contracts were made with free and 
full consent, neither the couple nor their parents could break them without proof of an 
impediment.  A mere change of heart by any of the parties, or a dispute over property and 
dowry, were not sufficient grounds to seek annulment.    
 
A Genevan father named Nepveur learned this lesson in 1556.64  Nepveur had 
consented to the engagement of his daughter Jeanne to one Louis Blanchet.  The parties 
had signed a written engagement contract, which specified the property payments that 
Louis was to make to Nepveur in consideration of the marriage.  Shortly thereafter, Louis 
wanted to move to another town.  Jeanne did not want to follow him.  The parties agreed 
to dissolve their engagement by mutual consent.  Louis had not delivered his promised 
payment to the Nepveurs, so father Nepveur decided to withdraw his parental consent to 
the engagement as well.  Louis moved away.  The Nepveurs then requested the 
Consistory for permission for Jeanne to be free to marry another. 
 
The Consistory denied their request.  An unconditional engagement contract, they 
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ruled, could not be broken either by the mutual consent of the couple or by the 
subsequent withdrawal of parental consent.  Moreover, failure of a dowry payment was 
never a sufficient ground to annul an engagement.  Jeanne was still bound by her 
engagement promise, unless she and her father could prove that Louis had actually 
deserted her -- desertion being a separate ground for annulment in Geneva.   
 
Similarly in another 1557 case, Jacques Gaudy had consented to his minor 
daughter Michee’s engagement to Nicolas Millet.65  Nicolas had promised to deliver an 
ample engagement gift to father Jacques, when Nicolas returned from a journey.  Nicolas 
was delayed on his return, and then did not tender the full promised payment, causing 
Jacques to lose some land he had intended to buy with the promised funds.  An angry 
Jacques declared that he was withdrawing his consent to the engagement, and forcibly 
took his daughter Michee back into his own custody.  The Consistory sought to reconcile 
the parties, explaining to them that his post hoc withdrawal of consent was ineffective.  
They also reprimanded Nicolas for his delinquency, and ordered him to make the full 
promised engagement gift.  An enraged Jacques, however, said he would refuse the 
money if tendered because he now believed the young man to be dishonest and wanted 
him out of the family.  After further attempts at reconciliation failed, the Consistory sent 
the matter to the Council for final disposition, recommending that ‘such [engagements to] 
marriage should not be broken and may not be dissolved, for this would open the door to 
many others.’66   
 
The Consistory reserved the right to second guess the parents, especially when 
the cases involved young children or the Consistory suspected foul play.  In a 1556 case, 
for example, the Consistory annulled the engagement of a 14-year old young woman 
Françoise Chastellain who had a debilitating ‘hump’ that would preclude pregnancy and 
perhaps even intercourse.67  Françoise had evidently consented to the union.  Her father 
had approved the match, and had executed a prenuptial contract with her fiancé and his 
family.  Françoise’s father now insisted that the Consistory allow the marriage to go 
forward.  The Consistory decided not only that the woman was too young to be married 
now, but also that her ‘hump’ was an absolute impediment to marriage altogether.  They 
annulled the engagement contract, despite the loud protests by the father and fiancé.  
 
In a 1547 case, the Consistory learned that Pierre Mestrazat had become engaged 
to a ten-year old girl in another town.68 Pierre had forced the girl’s mother to give her 
consent to the engagement and allow him to marry the young girl as soon as she came of 
age.  He was now threatening to take the child away to a Catholic territory. All this was 
‘scandalous,’ said the Consistory.  They called upon the mother to testify.  She confirmed 
that Pierre had not only threatened her but in fact had ‘beaten her villainously’ in order to 
extract her consent to her daughter’s engagement.  Yet, the mother said she was willing 
to accept Pierre as her ‘son’ if he promised to live by the Word of God.  The mother was 
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not just being pious and charitable.  Pierre had evidently signed a contract to pay the 
costs of the girl’s apprenticeship and maintenance in exchange for her later hand in 
marriage.  With no mention in the record of any father, it was likely that this was a single 
mother doing the best she could to support her child.   
 
Pierre intimated that he would be happy to cancel the engagement contract -- and, 
by implication, cancel his contract to pay the girl’s maintenance and support expenses as 
well.  The Consistory would hear none of it.  No doubt still scandalized by the evidence of 
Pierre’s belligerence and his threat to take the girl to a Catholic home, the Consistory 
insisted on Pierre’s full performance of both the engagement contract and the 
maintenance contract.  At the same time, they reserved the girl’s right to rescind the 
engagement contract when she reached the age of consent, which was stipulated as 
fourteen years of age in this case.  The Consistory thereby made Pierre the victim of his 
own hard bargaining.  Pierre had forced the mother into accepting what was, in effect, an 
installment contract to marry a young virgin.  The Consistory converted this into a 
mandatory child support contract with no guarantee of a bride in return.  Indeed, there is 
no record that Pierre and the girl were ever married upon her reaching the age of 
consent.  
   
The Consistory ruled similarly in a 1546 case involving the purported marriage of 
two nine-year olds, Jean Dimier and Nicolarde du Pont.69  This ‘marriage’ was a 
guardianship arrangement gone utterly amiss.  Nicolarde’s parents needed to find a place 
for her to live.  They had arranged with Jean’s father, Claude, to become a guardian to 
Nicolarde and to take her into his home.  Claude promised to raise her as if she were his 
own child.  Nicolarde’s parents gave him funds for Nicolarde’s maintenance and support.  
So far, there was nothing unusual in this arrangement.   
 
But then, inexplicably, the parents had their local minister marry young Nicolarde to 
young Jean, Claude’s son.  Even more inexplicably, the minister married the youngsters 
without reservation.  It is hard to know what was motivating the parties to take this 
unusual step.  There was no obvious legal advantage for the couple to be married at this 
early stage of life.  Whatever testamentary advantages might have been gained by the 
marriage were so remote that this could not have been the motivation. Perhaps 
Nicolarde’s parents thought that Claude’s duties of guardianship would be more 
effectively delivered if his ward Nicolarde were his daughter-in-law rather than just a 
stranger.  Perhaps Claude and his wife wanted to have a daughter, and this arrangement 
gave them the benefits of effectively adopting a daughter without having to pay for her 
support.  The record does not clearly say. 
 
The record does make clear, however, that Jean’s parents thought that the couple 
was married.  Young Nicolarde and Jean were made to sleep together, albeit with father 
Claude present.  But when Nicolarde wet the bed ‘under him,’ Jean became ‘disgusted’ 
with her.  Claude and his wife beat Nicolarde severely for her misbehavior and wanted 
her out of the house.   
 
 








A complaint about the minister from Nicolarde’s home town brought this whole 
unusual arrangement to the Geneva Consistory’s attention.  The Consistory rebuked both 
sets of parents for their ‘monstrous’ impropriety.  They questioned the children closely.  It 
was obvious that neither Nicolarde nor Jean understood what marriage meant, nor 
considered themselves to be married.  The Consistory thus asked the Council to remove 
Nicolarde from Claude’s home and guardianship and to safeguard her assets.  They also 
asked the Council to declare the marriage contract ‘void[able]’ and to give the parties the 
right to confirm or deny the marriage when they reached maturity.  Four years later, when 
the couple came of age, Nicolarde’s father, no doubt still chastened by their earlier 
rebuke, asked the Council whether the couple could marry.  Though Jean wanted to 
marry, Nicolarde dissented because of her earlier mistreatment by Jean’s family.  The 
Council thus dissolved the engagement contract and declared that the parties were free 
to court and marry others. 
 
The Consistory maintained this position on arranged child marriages in later years.  
This can be seen in a 1557 case of Jaques Rosset and his fiancée Madeleine Lechiere.70  
The couple had become engaged when both were minors.  Claude had apparently used 
ample gifts of liquor to induce the woman’s family to consent to the engagement.  Since 
then, he had fraternized rather freely with Madeleine, much to her family's chagrin.  The 
couple had now reached the age of consent, and the issue was whether they should 
marry or could they break their engagement with impunity.  
 
Upon learning of the couple’s philandering, the Consistory ordered Madeleine to 
remain in her parents' home while the case was pending.  They then ordered that the 
marriage could proceed only if both sets of parents would come to the Consistory to give 
their consent to the union.  Claude’s parents appeared the following week to protest the 
marriage. The Consistory thus removed the case to the Council, recommending 
annulment of the engagement, and a permanent prohibition against the parties seeing 
each other again.  The Council ordered the engagement annulled and also imprisoned 
the couple for their evident fornication.  
 
Had this been a simple case of two youngsters promising marriage, the Consistory 
could have enforced the letter of the 1546 Marriage Ordinance, namely, that such 
promises were automatically void.  But, it was the purported consent of the girl’s parents, 
even though fraudulently procured, that must have given the Consistory pause.   
 
In the absence of both fathers and mothers, the Consistory would turn to guardians 
to give their consent to a minor child’s wedding.  Unless the absent parent’s last will and 
testament or a guardianship agreement stipulated otherwise, the views of paternal uncles 
and male siblings to the minor child were given priority.  In their absence, paternal 
grandfathers, maternal uncles, and full sisters to the minor child were consulted.  Paternal 
and maternal grandmothers, aunts, and more distant relatives were consulted only as a 
last resort.  The guardian stood in the shoes of the absent parents and was generally free 
 
 







to consent to or dissent from a minor ward’s engagement.71  
 
The Consistory would inquire more closely, however, when a guardian neglected 
or abused his or her authority.  An egregious example came in a 1546 case involving a 
young woman named Mademoiselle Fertz.72  Fertz had just lost her parents to the plague.  
By their last will and testament, her parents had appointed one Pierre Gravier as her 
guardian.  Shortly thereafter, Gravier began sleeping with Fertz.  Fertz herself then 
became infected with the plague.  She went to the hospital. There she met another man 
Pierre Dolen.  They, too, began sleeping together.  A few days later, Dolen and Fertz 
became engaged.  They kept the matter secret, evidently not wishing to seek the consent 
of Gravier, Fertz’s guardian and first lover.  But Dolen gave Fertz an engagement ring to 
wear.  They also broke into Fertz’s late parents’ home and took some of the money and 
property they found there.  They were imprisoned for their fornication and burglary, but 
thereafter continued to live together.  They then sought to publish their banns of marriage, 
bringing them again to the attention of the Consistory.   
 
The Consistory summoned Gravier, the guardian, to answer whether he consented 
to his ward Fertz’s marriage.  They learned more than they could have expected.  Gravier 
would not approve the marriage. When they pressed him as to why, Gravier admitted to 
his earlier affair with Fertz.  He also testified to his surprise (and no doubt his pique) that 
Fertz had suddenly become engaged to Dolen.  Gravier did not consent to the 
engagement, but also had done nothing either to care for Fertz or to safeguard the 
property she had inherited.  For the Consistory, this nonfeasance was evidently more 
than enough to disqualify Gravier from his guardianship, for he faded from the story.73   
 
The Consistory focused their attention on Fertz and Dolen.  Because the couple 
had contracted and consummated a clandestine engagement, the Council, on the 
Consistory’s recommendation, annulled their union and punished them severely for their 
flagrant fornication.  Thereafter, they were left free to enter a new engagement contract -- 
provided Fertz’s closest relatives were found to give their consent, and provided further 
that the couple desist from future fornication and cohabitation until their wedding.   
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Parental consent to engagement and marriage was one of the staples of early 
Protestant theology and law.  In the first generation of the Reformation, Martin Luther, 
Martin Bucer, Ulrich Zwingli, and others had held up the doctrine of parental consent as 
 
 
71 See examples in Seeger, Nullité, 363-365.  
72 R. Consist. II, 86v, 88, 100v. 
73 Gravier may well have faced criminal prosecution as well.  Even consensual sex between a guardian and 
ward was a serious crime in Geneva.  A 1566 statute that codified the prevailing law provided that a 
‘guardian or trustee who has fornicated with his ward ... will be proceeded against more severely, even to 
death if necessary, according to the severity and circumstances of their crimes, at the discretion of the 
judges.’ Emile Rivoire and Victor van Berchem, eds., Les sources du droit du canton de Genève, 4 vols. 







their biblical answer to the late medieval toleration of clandestine engagements and 
marriages.  Unless they had consented to their minor child’s unions, parents could seek 
their annulment.  Unless they could prove their parents’ abuse, children would be 
punished for entering such contracts clandestinely.  For many reformers, the requirement 
of parental consent was a moral right and duty anchored in the Fifth Commandment: 
‘Honor thy father and thy mother.’   
 
Calvin and his colleagues in Geneva accepted much of the prevailing Protestant 
law of parental consent.  They declared parental consent, like individual consent, to be 
indispensable to the validity of a minor’s engagement.  The Geneva Consistory inquired 
closely into the engagements of minors, and routinely dissolved them if their parents 
dissented.  Not only the couple themselves, but also a parent, guardian, witness, or 
notary to an engagement contract could be punished if they failed to get the necessary 
consent from both sets of parents.  Overbearing or officious parents or guardians would 
be punished for intruding on the consent of their children or wards.  Once parents or 
guardians had given their consent to their minor children’s engagement or marriage, they 
could not withdraw it.  Only proof of another impediment would allow the parents to seek 
annulment of an engagement or marriage to which they had consented.  
 
 Calvin ultimately rejected the law of some Protestant communities that allowed 
parents to annul their children’s clandestine marriages as well.  Calvin had left this 
question unresolved in his 1546 Marriage Ordinance.  Initially, he was attracted to 
conventional Protestant arguments that unless parents could annul their children’s 
clandestine marriages, the doctrine of parental consent would be a mere form of words 
that guaranteed nothing.  Initially, he was also turned off by Catholic arguments that 
clandestine marriages could not be dissolved because they were sacramental.  This, too, 
for Calvin was a mere form of words that proved nothing: If marriage was an indissoluble 
sacrament, why should its sacramental status not turn on whether it was properly formed 
by the couple and approved by their parents.  
 
 Calvin ultimately abandoned this early position and resolved that clandestine 
marriages once consummated could not be dissolved by anyone, including the couple 
and their parents.  His concerns were in part prudential -- about the dangers of parental 
tyranny and the costs of marital breakup to the couple and their children.  His motivations 
were perhaps also pragmatic.  After all, in a small city like Geneva, with its intensely 
active Consistory and its multi-step public marriage process, it would have been hard for 
a clandestinely engaged couple to sneak into marriage without discovery by parents or 
guardians.  To be valid, their banns would have to be posted, their certificates publicly 
registered, their wedding publicly celebrated during a worship service.  Throughout this 
time -- and indeed until the very last step in the marriage liturgy when the pastor called ‘if 
anyone has reason to object to this marriage’ -- anyone could protest the match, not least 
the parents or guardians of the couple.  This objection would have automatically halted 
the process, and put the couple before the Consistory.  If they were minors, the 
Consistory would require them to prove that they had their parents’ consent.  If they did 
not have it, their engagement would be annulled.  With all these safeguards in place, 







their marital beds undisturbed.  At that point, it was as much the parents’ and 
community’s negligence, as their children’s delinquency, that the couple had been 
clandestinely married.  
 
Calvin also accepted much of the prevailing Protestant theology of parental 
consent – but with two somewhat peculiar new accents.  First, Calvin’s concerns for 
daughters and mothers in the process of marital formation stood sharply juxtaposed.  On 
the one hand, Calvin was surprisingly jealous to ensure that girls were as protected from 
tyrannical parents as boys were in their decision to marry.  This was biblically 
counterintuitive.  Both the stories in Genesis and the laws of Moses were filled with 
examples showing that young women had little voice and few rights in the decision to get 
married, especially vis-à-vis their fathers.  Yet, Calvin showed little patience with any of 
this.  He repeatedly castigated biblical fathers who sold, coerced, or tricked their 
daughters into marriage.  And he lifted up the one example of Bethuel and Rebekah as 
exemplary of what the natural law teaches about how a father was to care for his 
daughter’s consent.   
 
On the other hand, Calvin was surprisingly churlish about the role of the mother in 
consenting to her minor’s engagement and marriage.  Her views counted only if her 
husband was absent, and then only if they concurred with that of other relatives.  Even 
hearsay testimony of a father’s wishes was given priority to a mother’s contrary written 
and oral statements before the Consistory.  This strong accent on the father’s voice was, 
of course, typical of the stories in Genesis and the laws of Moses, and indeed of some of 
the New Testament household codes as well.  But why should Calvin stick to the letter 
and spirit of Bible on the place of a wife, but not on the place of a daughter?  Calvin did 
not say.  
 
This first peculiarity may well be related to a second, namely, Calvin’s reliance on 
natural law, rather than the Fifth Commandment, for the doctrine of parental consent.  
This was not unprecedented.  But both the early Church Fathers and other early 
Protestants had seen the doctrine of parental consent as part and product of the 
Commandment: ‘Honor thy father and thy mother.’ Indeed, the rest of the Commandment 
seemed to underscore the wisdom of such obedience to parents for the future happiness 
of children: ‘so that your days may be long in the land that the Lord your God gives you.’  
 
For all his robust exegesis of the Decalogue as a source and summary of natural 
law on many other aspects of life, Calvin did not follow it on the issue of parental consent.  
Instead, he pointed vaguely and variously to natural law, the law of nations, common 
equity, and plain common sense to argue for the doctrine.  It is hard to know what 
motivated Calvin in this choice of authority.  Perhaps it came down to the simple fact that 
Calvin had written into his 1546 Marriage Ordinance that it was the consent of the fathers, 
not the mothers, that counted, and he was sticking to it.  It would have been hard to 
square this provision with the Commandment to ‘[h]onor thy father and thy mother.’  But 
this was not Calvin’s usual style.  He was certainly firm and fierce in defending what he 
wrote.  But he would sometimes change his mind, especially when the Bible charted a 







Calvin did not follow it.  
  
  
